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LIVING ON THE EDGE: THE MARGINS OF LEGAL
PERSONHOOD
SYMPOSIUM FOREWORD
Kimberly Kessler Ferzan*
In January 2008, at the Association of American Law Schools’ annual
meeting, the Jurisprudence Section conducted a panel on “The Margins of
Legal Personhood.” The goal of this panel was to draw (or sever)
connections between and among different “marginal” entities: the
psychopath, the animal, and the embryo or fetus.1 As is perhaps immediately
apparent, these entities are not marginalized in a political sense, but rather lie
at the margins of our moral and legal communities. Prima facie, they may
have some, but lack all of the capacities necessary for full membership.
Because they live on the edge, we must question whether they may be held
*
Associate Dean for Faculty Affairs, Professor of Law, & Co-Director of the Institute
for Law & Philosophy, Rutgers University, School of Law—Camden. I wish to thank the
Rutgers Law Journal (and specifically Eric Daleo, Brian Ellis, Brian Fitzsimons, Jim Kramer,
and Chandana Ravindranath) for their hard work in publishing this Symposium, and Maggie
Little for her comments on a draft of this essay. I am grateful to Taimie Bryant, Maggie Little,
Paul Litton, and Larry Solum for being willing to participate in the AALS panel and share
their views with me. I have learned a great deal from each of them.
1. Larry Solum also presented a paper on zombies based on David Chalmers’ famous
thought experiment. See generally DAVID J. CHALMERS, THE CONSCIOUS MIND: IN SEARCH OF
A FUNDAMENTAL THEORY (1996).
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responsible and whether they have rights. And, throughout our analysis, we
should remain consistent—the test for one entity should apply to another,
absent some principled distinction between them.
In the articles that follow, Professors Taimie Bryant, Margaret Little, and
Paul Litton take seriously these concerns with regard to animals, abortion,
and psychopathy, respectively. This brief Foreword serves both to introduce
the ideas presented in their articles and to attempt to draw connections
between them.
I. PSYCHOPATHS
In his contribution to this Symposium, Professor Paul Litton resolves a
puzzle that has long perplexed moral and criminal law theorists: Is it fair to
hold a psychopath morally and legally responsible if he simply does not
“get” morality?2 Litton reveals that our assumptions about psychopathy have
been too thin, as, according to Litton, rational self-governance requires
affective capacities.3 In other words, there is no conceptual space for the
rational self-governing psychopath.
Despite popular misconceptions, all criminals are not psychopaths
(although some psychopaths are criminals). Rather, under the traditional
understanding, the psychopath is an individual who fails to understand moral
norms because he lacks the capacity to form emotional attachments to
others.4 Viewed this way, one might imagine the psychopath to be akin to
Data from Star Trek. Data, an android, does not form any emotional
attachments. He can only act logically and rationally. Applied to the
psychopath, all criminal laws appear to the psychopath as malum prohibitum
laws appear to us – the only reason we have to follow these laws is because

2. See generally Paul Litton, Responsibility Status of the Psychopath: On Moral
Reasoning and Rational Self-Governance, 39 RUTGERS L.J. 351 (2008).
3. See id. Part IV.
4. See, e.g., Peter Arenella, Convicting the Morally Blameless: Reassessing the
Relationship Between Legal and Moral Accountability, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1511, 1564 (1992)
(arguing from the psychopath’s perspective that he or she “lack[s] the ability to either feel
concern for the interests of others or appreciate why their interests merit [his or her] respect”);
Jeffrie G. Murphy, Moral Death: A Kantian Essay on Psychopathy, 82 ETHICS 284, 286-87
(1972) (“They do not care about others or their duties to them, have no concern for others’
rights and feelings, do not accept responsibility, and do not know what it is like to defer one’s
own gratifications out of respect for the dignity of another human being. Quite significantly,
they feel no guilt, regret, shame, or remorse (though they may superficially fake these
feelings) when they have engaged in harmful conduct.”).
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we will otherwise be punished. The laws do not forbid anything morally
wrong in and of themselves.
In his contribution, Litton questions the empirical picture of the
psychopath and, in so doing, questions our conceptual picture of rational
self-governance. Litton argues that a requirement for rational selfgovernance is the capacity to reflect on, to evaluate, and to further one’s
ends.5 This requires an ability to give and assess the value of one’s ends.6
Because psychopaths cannot assign value and act in accordance with the
weight of these values, the psychopath is not simply morally blind – he is
irrational.7
Litton’s claim that psychopathy raises rationality concerns may not be
such good news for the psychopath. Deep irrationality may take the
psychopath out of the holding-responsible frying pan and into the rightsdenying fire. If psychopaths (an admittedly degreed category; these
generalities may be true of only the extreme cases) are dangerous and
irrational human beings, what may we do to them to prevent them from
harming us? That is, once we push the psychopath out of our moral
community, he may not only lack the status of being held responsible but he
may also face the consequence of having fewer rights.8
At a recent conference I attended, when this question arose, one theorist
answered by comparing the psychopath to a tiger and arguing that we should
treat the psychopath just as we would treat a tiger – we should put him in a
5.
6.
7.
8.

See Litton, supra note 2, at 366-68.
Id.
See id. Part IV.
As Stephen Morse points out:
For people who are dangerous because they are disordered or because they are
too young to “know better,” the usual presumption in favor of maximum liberty
yields. Because the agent is not rational or not fully rational, the person’s choice
about how to live demands less respect, and he or she is not morally responsible for
his or her dangerousness. The person can therefore be treated more “objectively,” like
the rest of the world’s dangerous but nonresponsible instrumentalities, ranging from
hurricanes to microbes to wild beasts. In brief, agents incapable of rationality do not
actually have to cause harm to justify nonpunitive intervention. We can take
preemptive precautions, including broad preventive detention, with nonresponsible
agents based on an estimate of the risk they present.
Stephen J. Morse, Neither Desert Nor Disease, 5 LEGAL THEORY 265, 269-70 (1999); see also
Murphy, supra note 4, at 291 (“[P]ractices of punishment and responsibility are compatible
with a recognition of human dignity in that they place a premium upon the status of persons as
choosing beings. One alternative to this is therapy. One here gets not what one deserves but,
rather, what one (in some paternalistic sense) needs – perhaps a total restructuring of one’s
personality.”).
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cage. I demur. Does anyone doubt that we would unapologetically shoot an
animal that was as dangerous as some psychopaths?
I will return to questions about how we should treat the psychopath. For
now, though, let us note that the psychopath occupies a particular status
simply by being a human being. He enjoys a particular presumptive status –
not by polite extension – but because he is presumptively like us.
II. ANIMALS
In contrast to the presumptive privileges that the psychopath enjoys,
nonhuman animals certainly appear to live outside of our moral community.
In her contribution to this Symposium, Professor Taimie Bryant discusses a
range of heart-breaking examples of how humans mistreat animals.9 No
animal seems immune from our cruelty – even animals much like us have
been subjected to extraordinarily inhumane treatment.
There are two important themes within Bryant’s contribution. The first
theme is a repudiation of the need to compare animals to humans to make
claims about the rights of animals. Bryant believes this approach is
misguided for a number of reasons. For one thing, it may require humans to
subjugate some animals for the benefit of others. As she argues elsewhere,
under this approach, the increased status of the sea lion leads to increased
mistreatment of the fish they need to eat.10 Secondly, she rejects some tests
for moral standing, such as the capacity to suffer, because an animal’s
capacity to suffer only gives animals a claim against painful killings, not
killings writ large.11 Indeed, Bryant seems to reject that there is any sort of
critical question for standing within the moral community. At one point, she
9. Taimie L. Bryant, Sacrificing the Sacrifice of Animals: Legal Personhood for
Animals, the Status of Animals as Property, and the Presumed Primacy of Humans, 39
RUTGERS L.J. 247 (2008).
10. Id. Part I.A.1; see also Taimie L. Bryant, Similarity or Difference as a Basis for
Justice: Must Animals Be Like Humans to Be Legally Protected from Humans?, 70 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 207 (2007):
[H]ierarchical ordering of animals based on their similarity to humans would
increase harm to dissimilar animals by facilitating exploitation of dissimilar animals
for the benefit of animals deemed to be like humans. . . . If, for example, sea lions
were found to be sufficiently similar to humans that justice required their receiving
entitlements, their representatives surely would try to safeguard the health of sea lions
by securing for them all the fish they need, which would most likely mean increasing
the production of fish by intensive fish-farming.
Id. at 217-18 (footnote omitted).
11. Bryant, supra note 9, Parts I.A.1, I.B.
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describes the ecosystem surrounding the thorny African acacia tree and the
interdependence of the trees, ants, giraffes, and elephants.12 She argues that
we must protect the entirety of this ecosystem, not just the endearing ones
with the long necks or floppy ears.13 Most importantly, the question – how
are animals like us and therefore deserving of rights – presupposes that
human beings belong at the center of the moral universe, and it is this status
as central figure that Bryant denies.14
Bryant’s second theme draws on the property status of animals. She
believes that Professor Gary Francione has it exactly right – no progress can
be made for animals so long as animals belong to humans.15 She thus
advocates incremental undermining of this property status, focusing
specifically on two examples in which we have implicitly denied that
animals are property and can therefore be sacrificed even when supposedly
this killing is in the animals’ best interest.16
III. EMBRYOS AND FETUSES
Property and possession take a rather different form in the debate over
abortion. Here, “the woman’s body” as her property and basis for autonomy
is used to justify the termination of a zygote, embryo, or fetus’s life.
Professor Margaret Little, however, does not focus on the strength of the
“property” claim, but rather, the claim on the other side of the moral
equation.
Little’s contribution discusses our understanding of the zygote, embryo,
and fetus.17 Eschewing the polarized positions that this life has no intrinsic
status or that it is inviolable,18 Little argues that we should understand that
the fetus’ coming into a particular moral status is gradual.19 A fetus both has
a moral value as being something that could ultimately be like us, and it
partly has moral status because of what it has already achieved.20 As the

12. Id. at 266-67.
13. Id. at 267.
14. See generally id. Part I.
15. See id Part I.E.
16. See id. Part II.
17. Margaret Olivia Little, Abortion and the Margins of Personhood, 39 RUTGERS L.J.
333 (2008).
18. Id.
19. Id. at 334.
20. Id. at 341.
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fertilized egg becomes a newborn infant, the potential moral claims give way
to actualized ones.21 But both claims exist side by side.22
In offering this theory, Little tries to make sense of what are likely some
widely shared intuitions.23 The first is that it is simply not as wrong (if wrong
at all) to terminate a pregnancy within the first three weeks as it is to kill
one’s newborn infant. The second is that even the early termination of a
pregnancy seems to involve some loss. As Little notes, to see a zygote,
embryo, or fetus as lacking intrinsic status worthy of our regard is to see
mourning a miscarriage as a category mistake.24 And yet, we see loving the
entity and mourning its loss as a perfectly intelligible thing to do.
Because of her gradualist perspective, to Little, there are no clear lines
about abortion. The woman must weigh the interests of the fetus against her
own, and as Little reminds us, the requirements that pregnancy places on a
woman are significant.25 These intimate duties to share one’s body are duties
that can be satisfied by the mother alone.26 Moreover, as Little has elsewhere
noted, to carry a child to term is not just a biological event, but rather an
event that requires one to conceive oneself as a mother, thus profoundly
changing the mother’s own practical identity.27 For these reasons, Little
believes that there can be fully honorable reasons to terminate a pregnancy.28
But the point is that the reasons have to be good because the embryo has
some intrinsic moral status. That is, it is viewing aborting one’s fetus as akin
to killing a cockroach that is the category mistake.
As the intrinsic status of the fetus increases, and again, as the fetus has
opportunities for life outside its mother’s womb, actions that result in the
death of the fetus require much stronger reasons.29 The point, however, is
that the morality of abortion will always turn on a complex weighing of the
zygote/embryo/fetus’ interests against the mother’s, and the larger the moral
claim of the former, the better the latter’s reasons must be.
For these reasons, Little argues that law is insufficiently nuanced to be
able to encounter this constant balancing.30 Interestingly, her view comes
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 333.
Id. at 344-46.
Id. at 346.
Id. at 348.
Margaret Olivia Little, The Moral Permissibility of Abortion, in CONTEMPORARY
DEBATES IN APPLIED ETHICS 32 (Andrew Cohen & Christopher Wellman eds., 2005).
28. Little, supra note 17, at 346.
29. Id. at 346-48.
30. Id. at 349-50.
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quite close to that in Roe v. Wade.31 Roe’s viability distinction is a blunt
instrument but it presumptively recognizes where the weight of reasons must
be: by the point of viability, the fetus is worthy of our concern, and the
reasons to end its life must be extraordinary indeed.32
IV. FROM EMBRYOS TO ANIMALS
Debates about abortion often invoke comparisons between embryos or
fetuses and animals. For her part, Little uses both cats and five-year-old
children in contradistinction to embryos.33 Although I think there are parts of
Little’s article that Bryant is likely to reject, I believe that Little’s insight can
and should affect how we perceive animal rights.
There are some facets of Little’s argument that are not amenable to easy
translation. Recall first that she believes that embryos and fetuses have status
because they are “on their way to becoming one of us.”34 In this respect, the
embryo or fetus is pulled within the moral community because it would soon,
if gestated, be part of our human being core. Part of its tug, and its claim,
come from its future status. The transformation from “organismic good” to
“self” to “agent” is not a full transformation for the animal.35 The majority of
nonhuman animals are thus foreclosed from this highest achievement.
Of course, this varies from animal to animal. Some animals have
substantial cognitive faculties, while others only have the pull of sentience,
and thus, animals align along the same continuum that the zygote, embryo,
and fetus do, having less or moral intrinsic worth.

31. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). “[T]he State does have an important and legitimate interest . . .
in protecting the potentiality of human life. [This interest] grows in substantiality as the
woman approaches term and, at a point during pregnancy, [this interest] becomes
‘compelling.’” Id at 162-63.
32. Id. at 163-64:
With respect to the State’s important and legitimate interest in potential life, the
“compelling” point is at viability. This is so because the fetus then presumably has
the capability of meaningful life outside the mother’s womb. State regulation
protective of fetal life after viability thus has logical and biological justifications. If
the State is interested in protecting fetal life after viability, it may go so far as to
proscribe abortion during that period, except when it is necessary to preserve the life
or health of the mother.
Id.
33. See, e.g., Little, supra note 17, at 336, 338.
34. Id. at 341.
35. Id. at 343-44.
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There is no doubt that Bryant will reject these assignments of value.
Bryant’s concern, I believe, is grounded in the belief that any confrontation
between nonhuman and human will end badly for the animal. But here, I
hope, we can gain some insight from Little. After all, if the debate over
abortion tells us anything, it is that we must resolve the question of what to
do when rights and interests conflict.
In my view, Bryant cannot avoid the question of where the boundary lies
(or at least the assignment of some comparative values), even if she seeks to
deny that the human agent lies at the center. The reason, I think, is this: To
take Bryant’s ecosystem example, it is certainly true that many different
parts of nature are part and parcel of each other, and that any disruption may
be problematic. But such a theory yields not just that animals are inviolable
but also that plants are inviolable, and maybe even that some parts of the
earth may be inviolable.36 But in this case, what is a hungry human to do?
That is, if a human seems to do wrong on any account, then there is no
reason to eat tofu instead of turkey. That is, Bryant must give us a line (or
some other criterion for decision making), because if nothing goes than
anything does. There is nowhere for a skeptic to stand, and no grounding for
a moral claim.
On the other hand, Bryant’s cry for some humility on our part can and
should be heard. The recent (overdue) acknowledgement of global warming,
and the trend to fuel efficiency, hybrid cars, and the like means that humans
are finally beginning to view themselves as part of their environment instead
of the conquerors of it. One can only hope that we find some harmony with
animals as well. Bryant’s claim, ultimately, is both about intrinsic value for
all life and about the instrumental value that some lives play in promoting
others’.
We must recognize that granting intrinsic moral status to animals must
mean something, and even when such status varies depending upon sentience
and rational capacity, it must still be given weight. In other words, the view
implicit in comparing killing some type of being to killing a cockroach is that

36. As Bryant has argued elsewhere:
Most animals’ advocates respond by defining “animals” as sentient in ways that
distinguish them from bacteria and make it easy to wash our hands but difficult to eat
chickens. In other words, they would engage in the same line-drawing exercise as
animal exploiters, only drawing the line at a different point, one that would include
some animals as protected individuals. This is inadequate.
Taimie L. Bryant, Animals Unmodified: Defining Animals/Defining Human Obligations to
Animals, 2006 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 137, 165; see also id. at 168-70 (discussing coral).
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the cockroach has no value, but this may be a mistake. Even a cockroach
may be entitled to some respect.37
V. FROM ANIMALS TO PSYCHOPATHS
Of course, there can be little doubt that when an animal proves itself
dangerous to humans, humans will prefer their own lives. In the case of the
rabid dog, humans have to confront the danger that the animal poses.
Moreover, because a rabid dog is both dangerous and lacking of any
rationality, captivity is the most a rabid dog can hope for.
This brings us back to the psychopath. Though the psychopath was
thought to present a profound problem for conceptions of moral
responsibility, it appears as though the true problem is one for the criminal
law. Although minor defects in rationality may (or at least should) suffice for
mitigation in punishment,38 profound defects in rationality may leave the
psychopath utterly outside the moral community, yielding the result that they
should be exempt from the criminal law.39 Having failed to achieve the
potential status of agent, the psychopath looks very much like an animal, and
some like dangerous animals at that.
Taking the psychopathy challenge seriously, then, requires us to ask
what we should do with them if we are not and cannot punish them. Litton
raises some questions for the criminal law, asking whether, because we
cannot wrong the psychopath by punishing him, we should just continue to
act as we do. According to Litton, we cannot fix them; we can only detain
them.40 So why expend resources litigating these claims and create a schism
in criminal law when we will reach much the same result (detention) as we
do with criminal punishment?41 Years ago, Professor Jeffrie Murphy listed
the practical implications of preventatively detaining (or exterminating!) the
psychopath, including the possibility of false positives, the possibility of
corruption and abuse, and the allowance for self-deception about societal
responsibilities.42 If we learn nothing else from Bryant, it is that we must
tread wisely here. Exclusion from the moral and legal community can be
37. See Bryant, supra note 9, at 267 n.102 (discussing the intrinsic value of an ant).
38. See generally Stephen J. Morse, Diminished Rationality, Diminished Responsibility,
1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 289 (2003).
39. MICHAEL S. MOORE, LAW AND PSYCHIATRY: RETHINKING THE RELATIONSHIP 62-65
(1984).
40. Litton, supra note 2, at Part V.
41. See id.
42. Murphy, supra note 4, at 296-97.
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devastating. Moreover, though Bryant may find this concern less compelling,
we may always wish to be wary of how we treat other human beings – even
defective human beings. That is, we must always worry not only about
assessing the intrinsic moral worth of the psychopath but also about creating
a slippery slope that devalues us.
Perhaps the consequences of taking the pyschopathy challenge seriously
are too great to face head on, but, as a retributivist, I am awestruck by the
implications the other way around. What percentage of current prison
inmates must be significantly psychopathic before we worry that our
criminal justice system is just a system of preventive detention? How do we
teach our students to believe in moral desert, if sleeping in the same cell as
the morally deserving is someone whom we do not punish, but only contain?
How can our moral code simply co-exist side by side with the detention of
the dangerous?43
VI. A RICHER DEONTOLOGY?
At the conclusion of her article, Professor Little argues that the
categories of child and person are insufficient to cover fetuses. In her own
words, “the fetus deserves a theory of its own.”44 The intrinsic moral worth
of the fetus often conflicts with the pregnant woman, who is asked to
surrender her body to provide for it. These are not arms-length negotiations;
the relationship is unlike any other relationship that one entity may have with
another.
As the articles in this Symposium reveal, the need for a richer
deontology reaches beyond the fetus. Because our lives not only clash with
other “moral agents” but with those at the boundaries of our moral and legal
community (and beyond), we cannot simply apply our quid-pro-quo
negotiations to those who need, or suffer, but cannot reason (or reason as
well as we do). Thus, for each of these conflicts, we need a good theory
about how to understand both sides of the conflict so as to reach meaningful
and moral resolutions.

43. Cf. Paul H. Robinson, Punishing Dangerousness: Cloaking Preventive Detention as
Criminal Justice, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1429, 1450-54 (2001) (arguing that we should be
explicit about preventive detention).
44. Little, supra note 17, at 349.

